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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,

:
s:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

:

REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON
n/k/a REBECCA ANN BATIO
CROOKSTON HACKING,

:t
s
J

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940190-CA

Priority No. 4

s

BRIEF OF APPELLANT REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON HACKING
n/k/a REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON HACKING

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(i) (1992).

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's order overruling
and denying appellant's ("Hacking") objection to the recommendation
of

the domestic relations commissioner.

The commissioner ruled

that the custody of the parties' three minor children should be
changed from Hacking to appellee ("Crookston"); that Hacking should
pay child support based on an imputed minimum wage; and that
Hacking should also pay Crookston's attorney fees.
1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in changing the custody of the

three minor children from Hacking to Crookston solely on the basis
of the allegations in the petition and Hacking's failure to timely
file an answer, rather than conducting an evidentiary hearing on
whether a substantial change in circumstances existed and whether
it would be in the best interest of the children to change custody.
2.

Did the trial court err in failing to make any findings

of fact or conclusions of law as to the steps taken in reaching the
decision to change the custody of the minor children from Hacking
to Crookston.
3.
Hacking,

Did the trial court err in imputing a minimum wage to
for

child

support

purposes, without

conducting

an

evidentiary hearing on her earnings.
4.

Did the trial court err in awarding Crookston attorney

fees without taking any evidence on the financial situation of the
parties and the reasonableness of the fee.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The questions before the court raise the issue whether the
trial court, which has broad discretion in child custody matters,
abused its discretion in changing the custody of three minor
children and awarding child support and attorney fees.

Sukin v.

Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1922); Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d
193 (Utah App. 1992)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Crookston filed a petition with the district court to change
the custody of the parties' three minor children from Hacking to
himself.

An answer was not timely filed and a default certificate

was entered.

Hacking moved the court to set aside the default

certificate while Crookston moved the court to grant a default
judgment.

The commissioner granted the motion

for a default

judgment and that decision was upheld by the district court judge.
The order transferred the custody of three minor children from
Hacking to Crookston; awarded Crookston child support by imputing
to

Hacking

the

ability

to

earn

Crookston his attorney fees.

a minimum

wage;

and

awarded

The default judgment was granted

without any evidence being taken on whether there had been a
substantial change in circumstance justifying a change of custody,
and if it would be in the best interest of the minor children to
change their custody.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In this action the essential facts are:
1.

Crookston

filed

a petition to modify

divorce on about May 4, 1992.

the decree

of

The petition alleges that the

custody of the parties' three minor children should be changed to
Crookston

because

the

children

were

living

in

an

unstable

environment, under poor living conditions, and because Hacking had
interfered with Crookston's right to visit the children by not
3

keeping

Crookston

informed

of

their whereabouts.

(Record

on

Appeal, pp. 160-65 and Addendum A.)
2.

Hacking failed to timely file and answer to the petition.

(Record on Appeal, p. 167.)
3.

A default certificate was filed by Crookston on November

17, 1992.
4.

(Record on Appeal, p. 171 and Addendum A.)
A motion for default judgment was filed by Crookston on

January 20, 1993.
5.
1993.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 178-80.)

Hacking filed an answer to the petition on February 18,
The answer was filed prior to any default judgment being

entered, but it was also filed without permission of the court.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 187-88.) Hacking also filed a motion to set
aside the default judgment.
A«)

(Record on Appeal, p. 181 and Addendum

These documents were filed in behalf of Hacking by Richard S.

Clark, II, ("Clark") an attorney from Provo.
6.

Counsel for Crookston stated, in one of his affidavits,

that he had waited a significant period before filing the default
certificate because of representations made by Clark that an answer
was forthcoming.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 173-77.)

Clark, in his

affidavit, stated that it took some time to file an answer due, in
part, to problems in keeping in contact with Hacking.

(Record on

Appeal, pp. 185-86.)
7.

Crookston filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion

to set aside the default judgment on March 15, 1993.
Appeal, pp. 207-14.)

(Record on

In a further affidavit, counsel for Crookston

detailed the problems he faced in getting Clark to take any action.
4

(Record on Appeal, pp. 192-97.)
8.

In February, 1993, shortly after Clark filed an answer

and other documents in behalf of Hacking, he was suspended from the
practice of law.

Clark apparently did not immediately notify

Hacking or the court of that development.
9.

The motions filed by both Crookston and Hacking were

initially set for hearing in July, 1993, but the hearing was
continued because it had been learned that Clark was suspended.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 216-17.) Clark did not officially withdraw
from the case until faxing a notice of withdrawal to the court on
August 5, 1993.
10.

(Record on Appeal, p. 219.)

It appears that Clark did not inform Hacking, who was

living in Oregon, of the events taking place in the case. Hacking
maintains that she knew little about what was happening until
receiving a notice of a hearing for November 18, 1993.

It was

only after that notice was received that Hacking discovered that
Clark had been suspended and was no longer representing her.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 239-41.)
11.

The notice of hearing indicated that the pending motions

previously scheduled for July 1993, were to be heard on November
18, 1993.
12.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 229-30.)
Hacking obtained the assistance of Utah Legal Services to

represent her just prior to the November hearing.

(Record on

Appeal, p. 231.)
13.

The hearing was set before the commissioner who ruled in

favor of Crookston.

The commissioner denied the motion to set
5

aside the default certificate and granted Crookston the relief
prayed for in the motion for default judgment.

(Record on Appeal,

pp. 244-48, and November 18f 1993 Transcript, pp. 333-342 and
Addendum B.)

The effect of the order was to change the custody of

the three minor children from Hacking to Crookston, and to grant
Crookston child support and attorney fees, without any evidentiary
hearing.
14.

On November 26, 1993 Crookston filed an objection to the

recommendation of commissioner.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 250-52.)

The objection was heard by the district court judge on February 22,
1994.

The district court judge overruled and denied Hacking's

objection*

(Record on Appeal, pp. 262-63 and Addendum B.) Hacking

has now appealed that order.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 288-89.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in changing the custody of the three
minor children from Hacking to Crookston; in assessing Hacking a
child support obligation based on minimum wage; and in assessing
attorney fees, simply on the basis of the allegations raised in the
petition and Hacking's failure to timely file an answer. The court
should have set aside the default judgment; taken evidence on
whether

there had been a substantial change

in circumstance

justifying a change of custody; determine if it would be in the
best interest of the minor children to change custody; and issued
findings of fact and conclusion of law in support of the decision
6

reached.

ARGUMENT
Hacking takes the position that in determining whether to
change custody of minor children from one party to another, the
trial court must do the following:
1.

Determine

if there has been a substantial change of

circumstance justifying a change of custody,
2.

Determine if it would be in the best interest of the

minor children to make a change.
3.

If it determines that both conditions have been met,

issue specific findings of fact and conclusions of law along with
the order changing custody so that one may determine the basis on
which the court reached its conclusions.
In Soltanieh v. King, 826 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah App. 1992) the
Utah Court of Appeal stated:
Before modifying a custody or visitation
order, a trial court must find there has been
a material change in the circumstances upon
which the earlier order was based, and a
change in custody is in the best interests of
the child.
Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608,
611 (Utah 1984); Hogge v. Hoqqe, 649 P.2d 51,
54 (Utah 1982).
Where an original custody
determination involved a thorough examination
into the best interests of the child, a court
should rigidly apply the two-step change in
circumstances test in Hogge. Hardy v. Hardy,
776 P.2d 917, 922 (Utah App. 1989). However,
when the custody award is premised on a
default decree, the trial court has not made a
thorough examination of the child's best
interests.
Therefore, the trial court may
receive evidence as to the best interests of
the child when determining whether to reopen
the custody issue. See Cummings v. Cummings,
7

821 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah App. 1991). However,
when the trial court does not apply the twostep process, "it still must conduct a
separate analysis and make separate findings
as to substantial change in circumstances."
Id.
Further, in Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923-24 (Utah App.
1992) the Utah Court of Appeals pointed out the importance of
issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law in saying:
Trial courts are given broad discretion in
making child custody awards.
Maughan v.
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App. 1989).
The trial court's decision regarding custody
will not be upset "absent a showing of an
abuse of discretion or manifest injustice."
Id. at 159.
"However, to ensure the court
acted within its broad discretion, the facts
and reasons for the court's decision must be
set forth fully in appropriate findings and
conclusions."
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d
907, 909 (Utah App. 1988). The findings must
be sufficiently detailed "to ensure that the
trial court's discretionary determination was
rationally based." Martinez v. Martinez, 728
P.2d 994, 994 (Utah 1986).
"Specificity of
findings is particularly important in custody
determinations. This is so because the issues
involved are highly fact sensitive." Roberts
v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah App.
1992) .
In this case the court changed the custody of the children
solely on the basis

of the

allegations

raised

in

Crookston's

petition and Hacking's failure to timely answer it. The court took
no evidence on whether there had been a substantial change of
circumstance or if it would be in the best interest of the minor
children to have their custody changed from one parent to another.
No findings of fact or conclusions of law were issued.
It is submitted that there are few decisions more important
than determining the custody of minor children, and that the court
8

should have set aside the default certificate, taken evidence on
the issues, made a decision, and issued its findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of its order.

The most important

consideration is the best interest of the children, not whether a
pleading has been timely filed.

(See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10

(1989.)
There is no question that the allegations raised by Crookston
in his petition are serious, but they are only allegations. Also
important is the old legal maxim that one cannot fry a pancake so
thin that it does not have two sides. Hacking was never given the
opportunity to present her side of the story.
This case was in limbo for a long time and Hacking and her
former counsel may have contributed to that delay.

Nonetheless,

Crookston had the opportunity to set the matter for trial after
Hacking filed an answer after the default certificate had been
filed, but before the default judgment had been granted.

It is

highly unlikely that the trial court would have denied a request
for trial setting though the answer was filed without first
obtaining permission from the court.

Instead, Crookston chose to

pursue a default judgment for the next nine months.

Taking that

approach prevented any evidence from being presented on the best
interest of the children.
The court not only determined that custody should be changed
from Hacking to Crookston, but also that Hacking should begin
paying child support on the basis that she was capable of earning
a minimum wage. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (1992), provides
9

that:
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless
the parent stipulates to the amount imputed or
a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent
is
voluntarily
unemployed
or
underemployed•
In this case Hacking has never stipulated to an imputed income and
no hearing has ever been held to determine if income should be
imputed to her. The court simply imputed a minimum wage to Hacking
on the basis of the allegations in the petition and her failure to
timely file an answer.
The court also awarded Crookston attorney fees on the basis of
the allegations in the petition and Hacking's failure to timely
file an answer.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989) allows for the

court to award attorney fees in child custody cases.

The problem

again is that the award was made without the benefit of an
evidentiary hearing. If the court had allowed evidence to be taken
on the custody issue, it would have been in a position to evaluate
the child support and attorney fees allegations.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted
that the decision of the trial court to grant Crookston a default
judgment against Hacking solely based on the allegations in the
petition and her failure to timely file an answer was an abuse of
discretion and should be reversed•

The default judgment should be

set aside and the trial court instructed to take evidence on
whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances
justifying a change of custody and whether it would be in the best
10

interest of the children to make a change.

The Court should also

determine what, if any, child support and attorney fees should be
awarded.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that on this

day of

1994, I delivered two true and correct copy of? the ©RIEF OF
APPELLANT REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON HACKING; to Willard Bishop,
Attorney for Appellee, 36 North 300 West, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City,
Utah

84721-0279.
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ADDENDUM A

WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. 0« Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IK THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Plaintiff,

VERIFIED PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON,

Civil No. 884502229DA

Defendant.
COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, who represents and petitions the Court as
follows:
1.

On or about September 13, 1990, the above-entitled Court

executed its Decree of Divorce in this action,
2o

Among

other

things, the

Decree

of

Divorce

awarded

Defendant the care, custody, and control of the parties' minor
children,

being

Brian

Michael

Crookston,

Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston,

Andrea

Christine

Plaintiff was awarded

reasonable rights of visitation, specified in detail in the Decree
of Divorce.
3,

The award of custody and visitation was accomplished by

agreement, pursuant to a certain "Stipulation for Settlement". The
custody and visitation questions in the case were not litigated*
4.

Since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, circumstances

with respect to the custody, visitation, and support of the
children have changed substantially, as follows:

IfeD

A.

Defendant interfered with Plaintiff's rights of

visitation with the children, by falsely informing Plaintiff
of where she and the children were living, and thereafter, by
leaving the State of Utah and not providing Plaintiff with the
address of the children.
B.

Defendant has wrongfully subjected the parties'

minor children to numerous residents and school changes, as
follows:
(1) At the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce,
Defendant and the children were living with Defendant's
mother in Provo, Utah.

The children were attending

Joaquin School in Provo.
(2) On

or

about

October

31,

1990,

Defendant

absconded from the State of Utah, taking the children
with her, and moved to Tacoma where she resided with one
Scott Hacking, to whom

she was

not married.

The

children, of course, were required to change schools
also.
(3)

In or about the month of February of 1991,

Defendant moved to Coos' Bay, Oregon, where she lived
with either her mother or her grandmother. The children,
of course, were once again required to change schools.
(4)

In or about

the month

of March

of 1991,

Plaintiff returned to Provo to yet another residence,
enrolling the children once again in the Joaquin School.

2
\(o\

At this time, she lived with a friend by the name of
"Cindy".
(5)

In or about May of 1991, Defendant moved to yet

another residence in Provo where she resided once again
with Scott Hacking. This move required that the children
be enrolled in Timpanogos Elementary School.
(6) At or about Thanksgiving in November of 1991,
Defendant moved to 2537 South Lakecrest, #2 (1810 West),
West Valley City, Utah 84120, where she lived once again
with Scott Hacking. The children were required to change
to the Redwood Elementary School.
(7)

In or about early March of 1992, Defendant

indicated her desire to move back to Coos1 Bay, Oregon,
which would require yet another change of residence and
schools for the children.
(8) On or about March 16, 1992, Defendant absconded
from the State of Utah, leaving no forwarding address and
taking the children with her.
C.

Prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce,

Defendant's housekeeping habits were acceptable. Since then,
however, those habits have deteriorated to the point that the
children are not kept clean and their clothing and environment
emit bad odors.
D.

On or about March 4, 1992, Plaintiff remarried. He

now resides in a home purchased by him at 8845 South 630 East,
Sandy, Utah 84070, and can provide the children with a living
3
1 feSt

environment superior to that of Defendant, and can provide the
children with a stable, two-parent home, where they will not
be required to make constant moves and constant changes of
school.
5.

The change of custody from Defendant to Plaintiff is in

the best interest of the parties' minor children.
6.

Although it was anticipated at the time the Decree of

Divorce was entered that Defendant would obtain employment, she has
remained

unemployed.

Insofar

receives aid from AFDC.
without

benefit

of

as Plaintiff

knows,

Defendant

Scott Hacking, with whom she is living

clergy, receives

some form

of

disability

payments.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows 2
1.

That the Decree of Divorce in this matter be modified as

follows:
A.

To change custody of the parties' minor children

from Defendant to Plaintiff, subject to rights of reasonable
visitation in Defendant.
B.

To provide for child support to be paid by Defendant

to Plaintiff, in accordance with the applicable guidelines.
2.

That Plaintiff be awarded his attorney fees, costs of

court, and such other and further relief as the Court deems
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
3.

Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

DATED this

dav of March, 1992.

/%^>?^^r~-~~~
MICHAEL EUGEtfE CROOKSTON
4
i CP3

OPT
WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Plaintiff,

DEFAULT CERTIFICATE

vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON,

Civil No. 884502229DA

Defendant.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON:
In this action, Defendant REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON having been
regularly served with process, and having failed to appear and answer Plaintiffs "Petition
to Modify Decree of Divorce" on file herein, and the time allowed by law for answering
having expired, the default of said REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, in the
premises is hereby duly entered according to law.
WITNESS THE CLERK OF SAID COURT, with the seal thereof attached, this
/ 7 $ 7 day of November, 1992.

RJTCHARD S. CLARK I r .
Attorney at Law
18Q6 North Oakridge Lano
Provo, Utah 84604
(801) 377-3820
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
)

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT

)

REBECCA ANN BAT10 CROOKSTON

Civil No. 8845Q2229DA

Defendant.
)

COMES NOW DEFENDANT, by and through her attorney Richard S.
Clark II. and motions the court to set aside the default judgment
pursuant to rule 60 (b) for the reasons set forth in the
memorandum and affidavit of counsel attached hereto.

DATED this

/^

day of ^ U i ^ , 1993.

'RICHARD' s. CLARK II
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing document to Willard R. Bishop at P.O.
Box 279 Cedar City, Utah 84721-Q279.

2£_
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ADDENDUM B

2

S T . GEORGE, UTAH; THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1 8 ,

199 3

-oOo-

THE COURT:

884502229, Michael Eugene Crookston

versus Rebecca Ann Batio.
Mr. Julien?
MR. BISHOP:

I haven't seen him this morning,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

We're having tremendous trouble

getting this matter resolved, aren't we?
MR. BISHOP:
instructions.

I followed the Court's

I'm here, and I wish to proceed.

THE COURT:

He has filed a motion for

continuance.
Were you given a copy of that?
MR. BISHOP:

I got a copy, yes.

And I strongly

object to it.
THE COURT:

I do too.

Absent some indication in

writing from a trained medical person indicating that she
can't travel, I —

I don't see any reason to perpetuate

this nonsense.
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

No.
Mr. Julien, I have your motion to

continue, and I was just advising counsel this has just
been what appears to me a delaying action on the part of

D A T T T /^

3
the defendant.
MR. JULIEN:
only a —

Well, my motion for continuance was

sort of a lukewarm motion.

I only said that I

was unprepared to respond to allegations in the
THE COURT:

—

You know, something in —

in writing

from a trained medical person saying she can't travel might
have bent the Court a little bit.

But just her saying,

"I'm too sick to travel" is not going to cut it.
MR. JULIEN:

All right.

MR. BISHOP:

Fine.

I'd like to move forward if

I can, then, Your Honor.
There are presently
THE COURT:

—

Can I just sign this?

Will that

solve it?
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

Sure.

You bet.

This is an order overruling and

denying the motion to set aside default judgment.
MR. JULIEN:

Okay.

I don't get to say —• say my

position in this case?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

You can tell me your

position.
MR. JULIEN:

All right.

I'd like to for the

record.
THE COURT:

I haven't signed it yet.

I just

asked if that would decide the problem of addressing each
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of these issues that have already been addressed.
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. JULIEN:
memorandum —

Yes, it would.

Okay.

I have filed a supplemental

I suppose the Court has that —

outlining the

background as I see it in my brief appearance in this
case.
The way it looks to me is that you have a
petition to modify the decree of divorce filed by
Plaintiff.

I have it on May 4th, 1992.

Then you have

service upon Miss Crookston shortly thereafter.
Mrs. Crookston does not timely file an Answer,
and so a default certificate was filed November 17th, 1992,
by Mr. Bishop, and then you have Mr. Bishop filing a motion
for default judgment on January 20th, 1993.

And then you

have after that an Answer filed by Mrs. Crookston on
February 18th, 1993, by her attorney, Mr. Clark, and then
you also have a -— a motion to set aside the default
judgment filed on that same day.
So the way I look at it is as of February 20th,
199 3, you've got the petition, you've got the Answer and no
default judgment.

So it would seem to me at that point in

time, you would think, "Okay.
the Answer.

Here's the petition; here's

No default judgment.

Let's go ahead with the

trial."

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. JULIEN:

But Mr. Bishop or his —

at the insistence of his counsel —

probably

or of his client, files

a memorandum in opposition to setting aside the default
judgment.

I/m sorry.

A memorandum opposed to the motion

to set aside the default judgment.

And that thing has been

pursued now for nine months.
And so it appears to me that what's happened
here, we have the plaintiff doing everything he can to try
and get custody of the minor children changed from
Mrs. Crookston to him on the basis of a default
certificate.

Had there simply been a motion to proceed to

trial, this case may have been over by now.
And —

and the concern I have is we are talking

here about the custody of children.

Of what greater issue

And where 7 s the logic in changing

can there be than that?

custody from one person to another on the basis of
allegations simply raised in a petition?
THE COURT:

I agree with you, Mr. Julien, but we

can't get your client into a court of law.

And we haven't

been able to for two years.
MR. JULIEN:

Okay.

I can't respond to that,

because I wasn't present.
THE COURT:

No.

Obviously she doesn't value the

custody of her children as much as you do, because all

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

1

she's done is stall.

2

I agree that this issue should be tried on the

3

merits to see what is in the best interests of the

4

children.

5

And if she doesn't come to court, we could have a trial,

6

and they'd win anyway.

7

MR. JULIEN:

But if she won't come to court, we can't do it.

But there's never been —

8

actual trial setting that I'm aware of.

9

aware of much in this case.

10

THE COURT:

The -

11

have, Mr. Bishop, is that -

12

been entered.

13

MR. BISHOP:

14

THE COURT:

15
16
17
18

been an

of course I'm not

the technical difficulty I
is that judgment has never

That's right.

That's true.

so how could we set aside something

that's never been entered?
MR. BISHOP:

That's right.

That's their motion

to set aside the default judgment.
Probably, as Mr. Julien has pointed out, what

19

Mr. Clark should have done, as he indicated to me he would

20

do on the telephone and never did do, was to file a motion

21

to set aside the default.

22

That was never done.

I'd like to take a few minutes if I could to lay

23

out some background.

24

case from day one, and so he doesn't know a lot of

25

THE COURT:

And Mr. Julien hasn't been in this

We have, haven't we?

PAUL G. MCMULLTN
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MR. BISHOP:

Yes, we have.

Back in 1988, Mrs. Crookston took the kids and
ran.

Disappeared.

was going.

She didn't tell Mr. Crookston where she

At that time, a Complaint was filed.

an Order to Show Cause issued.

There was

We were here, and we had a

hearing on the 21st of December of 1988 on the issue of
visitation.

Mrs. Crookston came in, and she made some

rather serious allegations of physical abuse of the
children.

And we had a very extended hearing with detailed

evidence, and as a result, the Court made some very
specific findings.
In fact, that never occurred.

What she was

trying to do was she was trying to take normal family
difficulties and claim that they resulted in physical
abuse.

And as a result of that, Mr. Crookston was —

did

get some visitation.
Then at that time, Utah Legal Services was
involved, but it was Susan White that was representing
Mrso Crookston at that time.
The matter proceeded with some interrogatories,
and then the parties tried to reconcile.

They moved back

in together, and they were in together until, oh, I guess
early 1990.

There was another separation, and at that

time, the matter did proceed to a divorce, and there was
some visitation awarded.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
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Now, the decree of divorce was entered in
September of 1990.

Within a month of the entry of the

decree of divorce, Mrs. Crookston took the kids and ran
again.

Disappeared.

going.

No address where —

contact the kids.

Left no notice as to where she was
where he would be able to

The record shows that at or about the

time of the divorce, that she was making statements to
Mr. Crookston "I and the children should" —

"would be

better off if we could go and start a new life all without
any contact from you."

And that's what she tried to do.

She tried to take off and cut off all contact of
Mr. Crookston with the children.
There was a petition to modify filed in early
1991, because of the fact that she was interfering with the
visitation rights by running and not letting him know
where —• where she was with the children.
her address.

We had to come to court.

We couldn't find

We had to get the

Court to authorize us to issue a subpoena duces tecum to
the Offices of Family Services so we could obtain an
address and make contact.

And at that point, after we made

contact, believe it or not, she moved back from Washington
where she had disappeared and moved back to Provo.

And

that petition was at that point rather dropped, because
they were able then to have contact and have visitation.
Well, things looked to be all right until she

PATTT
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disappeared again.
address.

This time in 1992.

Didn't leave any

Mr. Crookston was able to track her down through

a search that he made, and we filed the second petition.
But what we have is a continual effort on her
part to avoid the Court's order; to avoid visitation; to do
whatever she can to terminate the relationship between that
father and his children.
Now, she was served personally with this
petition*

If you'll look, there have been no less than

five different times since this petition was filed that she
was given notice in writing or her attorney was given
notice in writing to get an Answer filed, or if not, her
default would be entered.

It never happened.

Now, the talk about the —
now been filed is not correct.

that an Answer has

There's an Answer in the

file, but it can't have been filed, because the default was
entered first.

In order to file an Answer, now she has to

obtain permission of the Court.

That has never been done.

Given these circumstances
THE COURT:

—

Then there's the question of the

validity of the Answer because of the status of her
attorney?
MR. BISHOP:

Yes.

MR. JULIEN:

I —

I did some checking on that*

Mr, Clark was apparently suspended in February of '93„

FlATTT
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Answer was filed in February of '93. I'm —

I'm assuming

that he filed the Answer just prior to, but I don't know.
MR. BISHOP:

So that's the situation.

We think

that under the circumstances of this case, that we are
entitled to judgment.
MR. JULIEN:

I just have one other —

comment, and then I'm done.

I —

I agree.

one other

If —

if

everything Mr. Bishop says is true, we certainly have a
substantial change in circumstance.

But can you say for

certain that it's still in the best interest of the
children to transport ~

for them —

the '— from the defendant —

from the plaintiff to

from the plaintiff to the

defendant or from the defendant to the plaintiff —
I?

what am

The defendant or the plaintiff?
THE COURT: A default is a default.
MR. BISHOP:

You're the defendant.

MR. JULIEN:

Okay.

Sorry.

THE COURT: A default is a default.
MR. JULIEN:
certificate.

Well, you've got a default

If that's all you need, why do you have to

file a default judgment?
THE COURT:

We need to change this order,

Mr. Bishop, to say motion to set aside default, not default
judgment.

And then —
MR. BISHOP:

Okay.

I used that because that was

11
the term of his motion.
THE COURT: And then you may file your judgment,
MR. BISHOP:

Thank you.

I'll do that.

THE COURT: Wait a minute.

You have your

judgment attached.
MR. BISHOP:

Yes.

I provided one.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BISHOP: All right.
THE COURT:
MR. JULIEN:

Thank you.
Now, is that the one we're going to

be •— are you — you're signing —

are you signing —• just

in case there were any appeal taken, is there, then, a
judgment being signed by the Court today?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. JULIEN:

Okay.

All right.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the proceedings in the
above-entitled matter were concluded.)
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Wiilard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801)586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
ORDER OVERRULING AND DENYING
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

Plaintiff,
vs.
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON,

Civil No. 884502229DA
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema

Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court on July 15, 1993, pursuant to Plaintiff's
"Notice of Hearing"., and Plaintiff having appeared by and through his attorney of record,
Mr. Wiilard R. Bishop, and Defendant not having appeared personally, but the
Commissioner having been contacted by attorney for Defendant, Mr. Richard S. Clark,
II, during which contact counsel for Defendant informed the Court that he could not
represent Defendant and would forthwith file a "Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel", and
the Court having continued a!! pending motions based upon the representation that such
a notice of withdrawal would be filed, and no such notice of withdrawal having been

COPY

filed, and good cause appearing, the Court having considered the files and records of
the case,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's "Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment" should be and it hereby is, overruled and denied.
RECOMMENDED this

/#

day of A&£aSt,"1993.
BY THE COURT:

C(H>

?>^-r

MARLYNNJS LEMA
Domestio-'Kelations Commissioner
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,

)

Plaintiff,

)

)
)
REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON, )

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

vs.

Defendant.

Civil No. 884502229DA
Honorable Marlynn B. Lema

)

This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema,
Domestic Relations Commissioner, on July 15, 1993, pursuant to Plaintiff's "Motion for
Default Judgment", brought up by Plaintiff's "Notice of Hearing". Plaintiff MICHAEL
EUGENE CROOKSTON did not appear personally, but was represented by his attorney
of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop, and Defendant REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON
did not appear personally, and was not represented by counsel. The Court had been
contacted by attorney for Defendant, Mr. Richard S. Clark, II, who indicated that he could
not represent Defendant and, as a result, would forthwith file a "Notice of Wthdrawal of
Counsel". Over the objections of Plaintiff's attorney, the Court continued hearing in

3-'s

connection with Plaintiff's "Motion for Default". The matter now having been brought
back before the Court by Willard R. Bishop, Plaintiff's counsel, and it appearing that
despite the representations of Richard S. Clark, II, that he would file a notice of
withdrawal of counsel, no such notice of withdrawal has been filed, and good cause
appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

That default judgment should be and hereby is, entered in favor of Plaintiff

Michael Eugene Crookston and against Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston, in
connection with Plaintiff's "Verified Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce" on file in this
action.
2.

That the care, custody, and control of Brian Michael Crookston, Andrea

Christine Crookston, and Kimberly Denece Crookston, the parties' minor children, should
be and it hereby is, awarded to Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston, subject to rights of
reasonable visitation in Defendant.
3.

That Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston should be and she hereby

is, required to pay to Plaintiff, reasonable child support in accordance with the applicable
guidelines, based upon Plaintiff's current gross income of $2,464.76 per month, and
imputed income to Defendant at the minimal wage rate of $4.25 per hour, 40 hours per
week, 4.3 weeks per month, for an imputed wage of Defendant in the amount of $731.00
2
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per month. Upon presentation of a completed, "Child Support Obligation Worksheet
(Sole Custody)", using three children and the wages stated, Plaintiff shall be entitled to
have the Court execute an "Order of Child Support" in the appropriate amount.
4.

That Plaintiff should be and he hereby is, awarded judgment for his

reasonable attorney fees and costs of Court, $361.98 attorney fees as shown by the
Affidavit of Willard R. Bishop, and $55.00 court costs, totaling $416.98; together with
interest upon the declining balance of said judgment at the judgment rate of 5.72% per
annum, from and after the execution of this document until paid in full.
RECOMMENDED this

/ f ^ d a v of XuguJTl993.
BY THE COURT:

Domestic Relati%i^<^^ff^Oner

U /

W1LLARD R. BiSHOP, P. C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-C279

Telephone: (801)566-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
)

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON
Plaintiff.

vs.

)
i
)
)

ORDER OVERRULING AND DENYING
OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION
OF COMMISSIONER

)
)

REBECCA ANN BATiO CROCKSTON. )
)
Defendant.
)

Civil No 894502229DA
Honorable James L Shumate

)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the Court on
Tuesday, Februan/ 22 1994, pursuant to Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston's
"Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner'

Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio

Crookston did not appear personally, but was represented by her attorney of record, Mr.
Stephen W. Julien, Esq of Utah Legal Services, Inc. Plaintiff Michael Eugene Crookston
appeared personally and vvas represented by his attorney cf record, Mr. Willard R.
Bishop. Argument was had. The Court having reviewed the files and records of the
case, having heard cral argument and having determined that the files arc records of
the case show the consistent color of tne efforts of Defendant to frustrate Plaintiff's

€tWY^

parental rights insofar as the children of the parties are concerned, and having
determined that the decision of the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations
Commissioner, insofar as it pertains to the "Order Overruling and Denying Motion to Set
Aside Default" and the "Default Judgment" entered in this matter on November 18,1993,
is correct in all respects, from both procedural and substantive standpoints, and good
cause appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows;
1.

That the "Objection to Recommendation of Commissioner" filed by

Defendant Rebecca Ann Batio Crookston should be and it hereby is, overruled and
denied.
2.

That the "Order and Overruling Denying Motion to Set Aside Default" and

the "Default Judgment" executed by the Honorable Marlynn B. Lema, Domestic Relations
Commissioner, November 18, 1993, and entered on the same date, should be and
hereby are, adopted as the order and decision of the Court; provided, however, that

2

pursuant to Rule 6-401(4), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, said decisions have
been the order of the Court from the time of their entry, not having been modified.

o
DATED this

/

M*tr
day of-Febftrary, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

/

JAMES'L SHUMATE, District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM.

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff

STEPHEN W. JUUEN
Attorney for Defendant
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ADDENDUM C

30-3-1

HUSBAND AND WIFE

30-3-1- Procedure — Residence — Grounds.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
fore, no fault need be proven to apply Subsection (3)(h) Haumont v Haumont, 793 P 2d 421
(Utah Ct App 1990)

ANALYSIS

rreconcilable differences,
unsdiction, district courts
rreconcilable differences.
Because Subsection (3)(h) does not set forth a
pecific fault of the defendant, in contrast to
ie other subsections, it can be inferred that
ubsection (3)(h), unlike the other provisions,
intended to be a no-fault provision There-

Jurisdiction, district courts.
When purported marriage is void ab initio
under *? 30-1-2, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree Van
Der Stappen v Van Der Stappen 815 P 2d
1335 (Utah Ct App 1991)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — No-Fault
vorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
Y U L Rev 79
A.L.R. — Insanity as defense to divorce or
Daration suit — post-1950 cases, 67
L R 4th 277

Divorce and separation effect of court order
prohibiting sale or transfer of property on
party's right to change beneficiary of insurance
policy, 68 A L R 4th 929

)-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees — Temporary alimony.
1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to
ablish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of
>perty in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs,
orney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
*ty to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order
y include provision for costs of the action.
2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support,
nony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
I attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed
n the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
ited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or
srs in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
I) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to
ride money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support
maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the
T party.
) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or
ment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order
idgment.
tory: C. 1953, 30-3-3, enacted by L.
ch. 137, * 1.
>eals and Reenactments. — Laws 1993,
I, i? 10 repeals former * 30-3-3, Utah
\nnotated 1953, allowing a court to order

either party to pay for the separate support
and maintenance of the adverse party and the
children, and enacts the present section, effective Mav 3, 1993

250

JL/1 V V/iVV^O

30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute.
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute:
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk in the
register of actions if both the parties who have a child or children and the
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is administered and have completed
attendance at the mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 except
if the court waives the requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of
one of the parties, upon determination that course attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the best interest of
the parties;
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court may specifically designate, unless an appeal or other proceedings for review are pending; or
(c) when the court, before the decree becomes absolute, for sufficient
cause otherwise orders.
(2) The court, upon application or on its own motion for good cause shown,
may waive, alter, or extend a designated period of time before the decree
becomes absolute, but not to exceed six months from the signing and entry of
the decree.
History: L. 1909, ch. 109, § 2; 1913, ch. 49,
§ 1; C.L. 1917, § 3002; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
40-3-7; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 5;
1985, ch. 33, § 1; 1992, ch. 98, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added the sub-

section designations and made related stylistic
changes and, in Subsection (l)(a), added the
language at the end of the subsection beginning with "if both the parties who have a child
o r children."

30-3-8. Remarriage — When unlawful*
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Van Der Stappen v. Van Der
Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

30-3-10, Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration,
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties.
The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
(3) If the court finds t h a t one parent does net desire custody of the child, or
has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third party, it shall
263
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

take t h a t evidence into consideration in determining whether to award
tody to the other parent
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, * 1; C.L. 1907,
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend^ 1212x; C.L. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C. ment, effective May 3, 1993, added Subsection
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch. (3)
122, *? 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1; 1993, ch. 131, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Award proper
Change of custody
— Burden of proof
Children's choice
Custody evaluation reports
Factors in determining best interests of child
— Moral character
— Sexual abuse
Findings required
Inadequate findings
Jurisdiction
Modification
P n m a r v caretaker
Cited
Award proper.
Award of custody of three children, ages 14,
8, and 6, to the father was affirmed, where both
parents were found to be well qualified for custody but the oldest child wished to live with
the father and the younger children wished to
remain with their older sibling Moon v Moon,
790 P 2 d 52 (Utah Ct App 1990)
Change of custody.
In change-of-custody cases involving a
nonhtigated custodv decree, a trial court, in
applving the changed-circumstances
test,
should receive evidence on changed circumstances and that evidence may include evidence that pertains to the best interests of the
child In ruling, the trial court should give stability and continuity the weight that is appropriate in light of the duration of the existing
custodial relationship and the general welfare
of the child The findings of fact should show
that the court considered stability as a factor
in the custody decision and indicate the weight
the court gave it Elmer v Elmer, 776 P 2d 599
(Utah 1989)
Courts should exercise caution in disturbing
custody awards during the early reconstructive
months after a divorce It is ordinarily best to
let the dust settle for a time, lest temporary
factors incident to readjustment be mistaken
for material changes Thorpe v Jensen, 817
P 2 d 387 (Utah Ct App 1991)
Circumstances of the noncustodial parent ordinarily do not bear upon the issue of whether
a change of custody is appropriate Such fac-

tors, aside from exceptional circumstances, are
not relevant to the court's inquiry Thorpe v
Jensen, 817 P 2d 387 (Utah Ct App 1991)
The fact that the mother had been generous
in sharing physical custody with the father
was not a ground to change physical custody, if
anything, it supported leaving primary physical custody with the mother, as it showed that
she had lived up to the responsibilities of a
custodial parent Crouse v Crouse, 817 P 2d
836 (Utah Ct App 1991)
The fact that the children have started
school does not indicate a substantial change
in circumstances because only changes not contemplated by the parties at the time of divorce
are relevant to the substantial change test
Crouse v Crouse, 817 P 2d 836 (Utah Ct App
1991)
—Burden of proof.
The burden of proof lies with the party seek
ing the change of custody That party must
first show that there hat> been a change in circumstances upon which the original custody
award was based that materially affects the
custodial parent's parenting abihH or the
functioning of the custodial relationship and
that justifies reopening the custody question If
a substantial change of circumstances can be
shown, the party must then show that the re
quested change is in the best interest of the
children Thorpe v Jensen, 817 P 2d 387 (Utah
Ct App 1991)
Children's choice.
During the course of trial on a noncustodial
parent's petition for modification of a divorce
decree, seeking permanent custody of the children, it was inappropriate for the court to place
as much reliance as it did on an eleven-yearold boy's statement (made to the judge alone in
chambers without counsel present) that he preferred to live with his father, the petitioner
Cummings v Cummings, 175 Utah Adv Rep
23 (Ct App 1991)
Custody evaluation reports.
Rule 4-903(2), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, permits an evaluator to submit a
written report to the court, thereb> contemplating the use of such a report by a trial court
in child custody determinations Linam v
King, 804 P 2 d 1235 (Utah Ct App 1991)
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78-2a-3

JUDICIAL CODE

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-3.

78-2a-3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
ind to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
nterlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except in cases involving a
first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
udges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
eview and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
riginal appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 25.

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer
statements and income tax returns.
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(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn m i n i m u m wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of t h a t parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a

parent, the income shall be based" for "Income
shall be imputed to a parent based," and made
a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214
became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
»* 1-z- xr
J
Modification of award.
Uted
*
Modification of award.
When the parties had agreed to the amount
of child support before the effective date of the
child support guidelines, the trial court erred
in modifying child support when no petition to
modify had been filed and in modifying the

support amount without finding that a matei l change of circumstances had occurred
since ^
previous order had been entered.
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(l)(b) prior to 1990
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on
existing support orders),

r a

Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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